We introduce the classified stable matching problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences over the other side. An institute classifies the applicants based on their research areas (or any other criterion), and, for each class, it sets a lower bound and an upper bound on the number of applicants it would hire in that class. The objective is to find a stable matching from which no group of participants has reason to deviate. Moreover, the matching should respect the upper/lower bounds of the classes. In the first part of the paper, we study classified stable matching problems whose classifications belong to a fixed set of "order types." We show that if the set consists entirely of downward forests, there is a polynomialtime algorithm; otherwise, it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a stable matching.
Introduction
Imagine that a number of institutes are recruiting faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both sides have their preferences. It would be ideal if there is a matching from which no applicant and institute have reason to deviate. If an applicant prefers another institute to the one he is assigned to (or maybe he is unassigned) and this institute also prefers him to any one of its assigned applicants, then this instituteapplicant pair is a blocking pair. A matching is stable if there is no blocking pair.
The above scenario is the well-studied hospi-tals/residents problem [7, 9] in a different guise. It is known that stable matchings always exist and can be found efficiently by the Gale-Shapley algorithm. However, real world situations can be more complicated. An institute may have its own hiring policy and may find certain sets of applicants together unacceptable. For example, an institute may have reasons to avoid hiring too many applicants graduated from the same school; or it may want to diversify its faculty so that it can have researchers in many different fields. This concern motivates us to consider the following problem. An institute, besides giving its preference among the applicants, also classifies them based on their expertise (or some other criterion). For each class, it sets an upper bound and a lower bound on the number of applicants it would hire. Each institute defines its own classes and classifies the applicants in its own way (and the classes need not be disjoint). We consider this flexibility a desirable feature, as there are some research fields whose boundaries are blurred; moreover, some versatile researchers may be hard to categorize.
We call the above problem classified stable matching. Even though motivated by academic hiring, it comes up any time objects on one side of the matching have multiple partners that may be classified. For example, the two sides can be jobs and machines; each machine is assigned several jobs but perhaps cannot take two jobs with heavy memory requirements.
To make the problem precise, we introduce necessary notation and terminology. A set A of applicants and a set I of institutes are given. Each applicant/institute has a strictly-ordered (but not necessarily complete) preference list over the other side. The notation x indicates either strictly better or equal in terms of preference of an entity e ∈ A ∪ I while e means strictly better. For example, if applicant a ∈ A strictly prefers institute i ∈ I to another institute i ∈ I, we write i a i . The preference list of institute i is denoted as L i . The set of applicants on L i who rank higher (respectively lower) than some particular applicant a are written as L i a (respectively L i ≺a ). An institute i has a capacity Q(i) ∈ Z + , the maximum number of applicants it can hire. It defines its own classification C(i) = {C i j }
|C(i)|
j=1 , which is a family of sets over the applicants in its preference list. Each class C i j ∈ C(i) has an upperbound q + (C i j ) ∈ Z + and a lowerbound q − (C i j ) ∈ Z + ∪ {0}, on the number of applicants it would hire in that class. Given a matching µ, µ(a) is the institute applicant a is assigned to. We write µ(i) = (a i1 , a i2 , · · · , a ik ), k ≤ Q(i) to denote the set of applicants institute i gets in µ, where a ij are listed in decreasing order based on its preference list. In this paper, we will slightly abuse notation, treating an (ordered) tuple such as µ(i) as a set. Definition 1.1. Given a tuple t = (a i1 , a i2 , · · · , a ik ) where a ij are ordered based on their decreasing rankings on institute i's preference list, it is said to be a feasible tuple of institute i, or just feasible for short, if the following conditions hold:
• given any class C 
Definition 1.2. A matching µ is feasible if all the tuples µ(i), i ∈ I are feasible. A feasible matching is stable if and only if there is no blocking group.
A blocking group is defined as follows. Let µ(i) = (a i1 , a i2 , · · · , a ik ), k ≤ Q(i). A feasible tuple g = (a i1 , a i2 , · · · , a ik ), k ≤ k ≤ Q(i), forms a blocking group (i;g) with institute i if
• for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, i a ij µ(a ij ) and a ij i a ij ;
• either there exists l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k such that a il i a il and i a il µ(a il ), or that k > k.
Informally speaking, the definition requires that for a blocking group to be formed, all involved applicants have to be willing to switch to, or stay with, institute i. The collection of applicants in the blocking group should still respect the upper and lower bounds in each class; moreover, the institute gets a strictly better deal (in the Pareto-optimal sense). Note that when there is no class lower bound, then the stable matching as defined in Definition 1.2 can be equivalently defined as a feasible matching without the conventional blocking pairs (see Lemma 4.1 in Section 4). When the class lower bound is present, the definition of the blocking groups captures our intuition that an institute should not indiscriminately replace a lower ranking applicant assigned to it with a higher applicant (with whom it forms a blocking pair), otherwise, the outcome for it may not be a feasible one. In our proofs, we often use the notation µ(i)| a a to denote a tuple formed by replacing a ∈ µ(i) with a . The order of the tuple µ(i)| a a is still based on institute i's preference list. If we write µ(i)|a, then this new tuple is obtained by adding a into µ(i) and reordered. In a matching µ, if a class C i j is fully-booked, i.e. |µ(i) ∩ C i j | = q + (C i j ), we often refer to such a class as a "bottleneck" class. We also define an "absorption" operation: given a set B of classes, (B) returns the set of classes which are not entirely contained in other classes in B.
Our Results It would be of interest to know how complicated the classifications of the institutes can be while still allowing the problem a polynomial time algorithm. In this work, we study the classified stable matching problems whose classifications belong to a fixed set of "order types." The order type of a classification is the inclusion poset of all non-empty intersections of classes. We introduce necessary definitions to make our statement precise. 
Definition 1.4. Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P k } be a set of posets. A classified stable matching instance (A, I) belongs to the group of P-classified stable matching problems if for each poset P j ∈ P, there exists an institute i ∈ I whose class inclusion poset P (i) is isomorphic to P j and conversely, every class inclusion poset P (i) is isomorphic to a poset in P.
We call a poset a downward forest if given any element, no two of its successors are incomparable. Our first main result is the following dichotomy theorem. Theorem 1.1. Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P k } be a set of posets. P-classified stable matching problems can be solved in polynomial time if every poset P j ∈ P is a downward forest; on the other hand, if P contains a poset P j which is not a downward forest, the existence of a stable matching is NP-complete.
We remark that if P is entirely composed of downward forests, then every classification C(i) must be a laminar family 2 . In this case, we call the problem laminar classified stable matching (henceforth LCSM).
1 Note that this definition allows a class to intersect itself, i.e., C = C i j ∩ C i j . This implies that C(i) ⊇ C(i). 2 A laminar family F has no pair of intersecting classes, that is, if A, B ∈ F, then either A ∩ B = ∅, or A ⊆ B, or B ⊆ A.
We present an O(m 2 ) time algorithm for LCSM, where m is the total size of all preferences. Our algorithm is extended from the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Though intuitive, its correctness is difficult to argue due to various constraints 3 . Furthermore, we show that several well-known structural results in the hospitals/residents problem can be further generalized in LCSM. On the other hand, if some institute i has a classification C(i) violating laminarity, then P must contain a poset which has a "V" (where the "bottom" is induced by two intersecting classes in C(i) which are its parents "on top.") We will make use of this fact to design a gadget for our NP-complete reduction. In particular, in our reduction, all institutes only use upperbound constraints. Sections 2 and 3 will be devoted to these results.
Our dichotomy theorem implies a certain limit on the freedom of the classifications defined by the institutes. For example, an institute may want to classify the applicants based on two different criteria simultaneously (say by research fields and gender); however, our result implies this may cause the problem to become intractable.
In the second part, we study LCSM using a mathematical programming approach. Assume that there is no lower bound on the classes. We extend the set of linear inequalities used by Baïou and Balinski [3] to describe stable matchings and generalize a binpacking algorithm of Sethuraman, Teo, and Qian [20] to prove that the polytope is integral. The integrality of our polytope allows us to use suitable objective functions to obtain various optimal stable matchings using Ellipsoid algorithm. As our LP has an exponential number of constraints, we also design a separation oracle.
By studying the geometric structure of fractional stable matchings, we are able to generalize a theorem of Teo and Sethuraman [21] : in (one-to-one) stable marriage, given any number of stable matchings, if we assign every man his median choice among all women with whom he is matched in the given set of matchings and we do similarly for women, the outcome is still a stable matching. This theorem has been generalized in the context of hospitals/residents problem [5, 12, 20] . We prove that in LCSM, this theorem still holds: if we apply this "median choice operation" on all applicants, the outcome is still a stable matching 4 .
A final ramification of our polyhedral result is an answer to an open question posed by Sethuraman, Teo and Qian [20] : how do we describe the stable matching polytope in the classical "unclassified" many-to-many stable matching problem? We show this problem can be reduced to LCSM by suitable cloning and classifications.
All the polyhedral results will be presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we conclude. Omitted proofs and details can be found in [11] .
1.1 Related Work Stable matching problems have drawn the intensive attention of researchers in various disciplines in the past decades since the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [7] . For a summary, see [9, 13, 16] . Vande Vate [22] initiated the study of stable matching using mathematical programming approach; further developments using this approach can be found in [1, 3, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21] .
Fleiner [6] studied the many-many stable matching in a much more general context. Using a fixed-point approach, he proved that stable matchings always exist provided that the preference of each entity is a substitutable choice function. Roughly speaking, such a function can be realized by imposing a matroid over a linear order of elements. In LCSM, supposing that there is no lower bound on the classes, then each laminar family is equivalent to a partition matroid. We prove that stable matchings always exist in this situation. Hence, our algorithm in Section 2 can be seen as a constructive proof of a special case of Fleiner's existence theorem.
Abraham, Irving and Manlove introduced the student-project allocation problem [2] . It can be shown that in LCSM, if all classifications are just partitions over the applicants and there is no lower bound, our problem is equivalent to a special case of their problem. They posed the open question whether there is a polynomial time algorithm for their problem if there is lower bound on the projects (classes). Our result in Section 2 gives a partial positive answer.
Two recent works [4, 10] also consider the Hospitals/Residents problem in the context of having lower bounds on the hospitals' side. In [4] , an interesting variation of the Hospitals/Residents problem which has a similar flavor to the current work is defined as follows: each hospital has its individual quota and sets of hospitals may also have collective quotas.
matching is to a certain degree lost in our generalizations. See [11] for details.
An Algorithm for Laminar Classified Stable Matching
In this section, we present a polynomial time algorithm to find a stable matching if it exists in the given LCSM instance, otherwise, to report that none exists. We pre-process our instance as follows. If applicant a is on institute i's preference list, we add a class C i a1 = {a} into C(i). Furthermore, we also add a class C i into C(i) including all applicants in L i . After this pre-processing, the set of classes in C(i) form a tree whose root is the C i ; moreover, an applicant a belongs to a sequence of classes a(
, which forms a path from the leaf to the root in the tree (i.e., C i aj is a super class of C i aj , provided j < j.) For each non-leaf class C i j , let c(C i j ) denote the set of its child classes in the tree. We can assume without loss of generality that q
) := 0. Our algorithm finds an applicant-optimal-institutepessimal stable matching. The applicant-optimality means that all applicants get the best outcome among all stable matchings; on the other hand, institutepessimality means that all institutes get an outcome which is "lexicographically" the worst for them. To be precise, suppose that µ(i) = (a i1 , a i2 , · · · , a ik ) and µ (i) = (a i1 , a i2 , · · · , a ik ) are the outcomes of two stable matchings for institute i 5 . If there exists k ≤ k so that a ij = a ij , for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and a ik i a ik , then institute i is lexicographically better off in µ than in µ .
We now sketch the high-level idea of our algorithm. We let applicants "propose" to the institutes from the top of their preference lists. Institutes make the decision of acceptance/rejection of the proposals based on certain rules (to be explained shortly). Applicants, if rejected, propose to the next highest-ranking institutes on their lists. The algorithm terminates when all applicants either end up with some institutes, or run out of their lists. Then we check whether the final outcome meets the upper and lower bounds of all classes. If yes, the outcome is a stable matching; if no, there is no stable matching in the given instance.
How the institutes make the acceptance/rejection decisions is the core of our algorithm. Intuitively, when an institute gets a proposal, it should consider two things: (i) will adding this new applicant violate the upper bound of some class? (ii) will adding this appli- 5 In LCSM, an institute always gets the same number of applicants in all stable matchings. See a generalization of the wellknown rural hospitals theorem in the context of LCSM in [11] .
cant deprive other classes of their necessary minimum requirement? If the answer to any of the two questions is positive, the institute should not just take the new applicant unconditionally; instead, it has to reject someone it currently has (not necessarily the new comer).
Below we will design two invariants for all classes of an institute. Suppose that institute i gets a proposal from applicant a, who belongs to a sequence of classes
We check this sequence of classes from the leave to the root. If adding applicant a into class C who is from a sequence of subclasses of C i a(j+1) which can afford to lose one applicant.
We define a deficiency number ∆(C i j ) for each class C i j ∈ C(i). Intuitively, the deficiency number indicates how many more applicants are necessary for class C i j to meet the lower bound of all its subclasses. This intuition translates into the following invariant:
In the beginning, ∆(C i j ) is set to q − (C i j ) and we will explain how ∆(C i j ) is updated shortly. Its main purpose is to make sure that after adding some applicants into C i j , there is still enough "space" for other applicants to be added into C i j so that we can satisfy the lower bound of all subclasses of C i j . In particular, we maintain
We now explain how ∆(C 
While there exists an applicant a unassigned and he has not been rejected by all institutes on his list 2:
Applicant a proposes to the highest ranking institute i to whom he has not proposed so far; 3:
Assume that a(
µ(i) := µ(i) ∪ {a} // Institute i accepts applicant a provisionally; 5:
For t = 2 To z // applicant a can be added into C i a1 directly; 6:
Let the lowest ranking applicant in $(C i at , µ(i)) be a † ; 10 µ(i) := µ(i)\{a † } // Institute i rejects applicant a † ; 11: GOTO 1; 12: If there exists an institute i with ∆(C i ) > 0 Then Report "There is no stable matching"; 13: Else Return the outcome µ, which is a stable matching; Figure 1 : The pseudo code of the algorithm. It outputs the applicant-optimal-institute-pessimal matching µ if it exists; otherwise, it reports that there is no stable matching.
In words, the affluent set $(C 
Correctness of the Algorithm
In our discussion, C i at is a class in a(C(i)), where t is the index based on the size of the class C i at in a(C(i)). Assume that during the execution of the algorithm, applicant a proposes to institute i and when the index t of the For loop of Line 5 becomes l and results in a † being rejected, we say applicant a is stopped at class C i al , and class C i al causes applicant a † to be rejected. The first lemma describes some basic behavior of our algorithm. (ii) Let applicant a be the new proposer and assume he is stopped at class C remains unchanged, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ l; moreover, given any class 
(iv) Suppose that applicant a is the new proposer and C i al ∈ a(C(i)) causes applicant a † to be rejected and a
Then immediately before the end of the while loop,
Proof. (i) can be proved by induction on the number of proposals institute i gets. For (iia), since Invariant A is maintained, if ∆(C i at ) is decreased for some class C i at , 1 ≤ t ≤ l, the algorithm will ensure that applicant a would not be stopped in any class, leading to a contradiction. Now by (iia), the set of classes {C
are (temporarily) surplus classes when applicant a is stopped at C i al , so $(C i al , µ(i)) = ∅, establishing (iib). Note that this also guarantees that the proposed algorithm is never "stuck."
(iii) can be proved inductively on the number of proposals that institute i gets. Assuming a is the new proposer, there are two cases: (1) Suppose that applicant a is not stopped in any class. Then a class C i at ∈ a(C(i)) can become surplus only if the stated condition holds ; (2) Suppose that applicant a is stopped in some class, which causes a † to be rejected. Let the smallest class containing both a and a † be C i al . Applying (iia) and observing the algorithm, it can be verified that only a class C i at ⊂ C i al can become a surplus class and for such a class, the stated condition holds.
Finally, for the first part of (iv), let C i al denote the smallest class containing both a and a
al , observe that the former must have been a surplus class right before applicant a made the new proposal. Moreover, before applicant a proposed, (iii) implies that for a non-leaf class C i a † t ⊂ C i al , the stated condition regarding the deficiency numbers is true. The last statement of (iv) is by the algorithm and Invariant B.
The following lemma is an abstraction of several counting arguments that we will use afterwards. 
(ii) Given a non-leaf class C 
and two sequences of classes with the following properties:
. Repeating the same argument gives us the sequence of classes.
For (ii), let us climb up the tree from C is tight in β,
. Now applying (i) gives us the sequence of classes in (iib).
We say that (i; a) is a stable pair if there exists any stable matching in which applicant is assigned to institute i. A stable pair is by-passed if institute i rejects applicant a during the execution of our algorithm. 
So, we can find two sequences of classes {C
, with the following properties:
The second set of inequalities implies that the classes • Suppose that |µ 
where the second inequality follows from Invariant B. Then there exists an applicant
, giving us a group (i ; µ φ (i )|a † ) to block µ φ , a contradiction. Note the feasibility of µ φ (i )|a † is due to the above set of strict inequalities.
• Suppose that |µ
So C i is a surplus class, and by Lemma 2.1(iii),
and invoke Lemma 2.2(i).
The above inequality implies that α i < β i and note that by Lemma 2.1(iii), the condition regarding β is satisfied. Thus we have a sequence of surplus classes
by virtue of Lemma 2.3. The tuple µ φ (i)|a † is feasible because of the above set of strict inequalities. Now (i; µ φ (i)|a φ ) blocks µ φ , a contradiction.
During the execution of the algorithm, suppose that class C i a † l † causes applicant a † to be rejected. In the subsequent execution of the algorithm, assuming that µ(i) is the assignment of institute i at the end of the while loop, then there exists l ‡ , where
Proof. We prove based on the induction on the number of proposals institute i receives after a † is rejected. The base case is when a † is just rejected. Let l ‡ = l † . Then it is obvious that all applicants in the affluent sets $(C i a † t , µ(i)), 2 ≤ t ≤ l ‡ , rank higher than a † and the rest of the lemma holds by Lemma 2.1(iv).
For the induction step, let a be the new proposer. There are four cases. Except the second case, we let l ‡ remain unchanged after a's proposal.
• Suppose that a ∈ C i a † l ‡ and he does not cause anyone in C i a † l ‡ to be rejected. Then the proof is trivial.
• Suppose that a ∈ C i a † l ‡ and he is stopped in class C i al , which causes an applicant a * ∈ C i a † l ‡ to be rejected. a * must be part of the affluent set $(C i a † l ‡ , µ(i)) before a proposed. By induction hypothesis, a * i a † . Moreover, since a * is chosen to be rejected, all the applicants in the
al , rank higher than a * , hence, also higher than a † . Now let C i al be the new C i a † l ‡ and the rest of the lemma follows from Lemma 2.1(iv).
• Suppose that a ∈ C i a † l ‡ and he is not stopped in C i a † l ‡ or any of its subclasses. We argue that a must be accepted without causing anyone to be rejected; moreover, the applicants in all affluent sets $(C i a † t , µ(i)), for all 1 ≤ t ≤ l ‡ remain unchanged. Let the smallest class in a † (C(i)) containing a be C i a †l . Note that before a proposed, the induction hypothesis states that
‡ , must have decreased during his proposal and this implies that he will not be stopped in any class.
It is obvious that
So assume that C i al * is a non-leaf class. Suppose for a contradiction that C i al * was a surplus class before a proposed. Lemma 2.1(iii) implies that
) must have decreased as well. But then this contradicts our choice of C i a † l * . So we establish that C i al * was not surplus and remains so after a's proposal.
• Suppose that a ∈ C i a † l ‡ and when he reaches a subclass of C i a † l ‡ or the class itself, the latter causes some applicant a * to be rejected. To avoid trivialities, assume a = a * . Let the smallest class in a † (C(i)) containing a be C To complete the proof, we need to show that either G = ∅ or all members in G rank higher than a † . If before applicant a proposed, a * belonged to a sequence of surplus classes C 
We now make use of Lemma 2. 
satisfying all the necessary conditions. Thus, we can discover a sequence of classes {C
and there exists an applicant a † ∈ (µ(i)\g) ∩ C i a † 1 . The above set of strict inequalities mean that all classes C i a † t , 1 ≤ t ≤ l † , are surplus classes in µ. Then a † forms part of the affluent set $(C i a φ l , µ(i)). By Lemma 2.5, they all rank higher than a φ . This contradicts our assumption that a φ is the highest-ranking applicant in g\µ(i).
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that in the final outcome µ, for each institute i ∈ I, ∆(C i ) = 0. Then µ is an institutepessimal stable matching.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists a stable matching µ φ such that there exists an institute i which is lexicographically better off in µ than in µ φ . Let a † be the highest ranking applicant in µ(i)\µ 
The second set of inequalities implies that we can find an applicant a φ ∈ (µ φ (i)\µ(i)) ∩ C i a φ 1 . Recall that we choose a † to be the highest ranking applicant in µ(i)\µ φ (i), so a † i a φ . Now we have a group
† is due to the above two sets of strict inequalities.
Based on Lemmas 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, and 2.7, we can draw the conclusion in this section.
where m is the total size of all preferences, the proposed algorithm discovers the applicant-optimal-institute-pessimal stable matching if stable matchings exist in the given LCSM instance; otherwise, it correctly reports that there is no stable matching. Moreover, if there is no lower bound on the classes, there always exists a stable matching.
To see the complexity, first note that there can be only O(m) proposals. The critical thing in the implementation of our algorithm is to find out the lowest ranking applicant in each affluent set efficiently. This can be done by remembering the lowest ranking applicant in each class and this information can be updated in each proposal in O(m) time, since the number of classes of each institute is O(m), given that the classes form a laminar family.
NP-completeness of P-Classified Stable Matching
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that the set of posets P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P k } contains a poset which is not a downward forest. Then it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a stable matching in P-classified stable matching. This NP-completeness holds even if there is no lower bound on the classes.
Our reduction is from one-in-three sat. It is involved and technical, so we just highlight the idea here. See [11] for details. As P must contain a poset that has a "V " in it, some institutes use intersecting classes. In this case, even if there is no lower bound on the classes, it is possible that the given instance disallows any stable matching. We make use of this fact to design a special gadget. The main technical difficulty of our reduction lies in that in the most strict case, we can use at most two classes in each institute's classification.
Polyhedral Approach
In this section, we take a polyhedral approach to studying LCSM. We make the simplifying assumption that there is no lower bound. In this scenario, we can use a simpler definition to define a stable matching. 
The definition of blocking pairs suggests a generalization of the comb used by Baïou and Balinski [3] . 
The tooth T (i, a) is defined for every (i, a) ∈ Γ as follows:
In words, (i, a ) forms part of the shaft S(A i ), only if the collection of a and all applicants in A i ranking strictly higher than a does not violate the quota of any class in a (C(i)). We often refer to an applicant a ∈ A i as a tooth-applicant.
We associate a |Γ|-vector x µ (or simply x when the context is clear) with a matching µ:
as the union of the teeth {T (i, a i )} ai∈A i and the shaft S(A i ).
Lemma 4.2. Every stable matching solution x satisfies the comb inequality for any comb K(i, S(A i )):
It takes a somehow involved counting argument to prove this lemma. Here is the intuition about why the comb inequality captures the stability condition of a matching. The value of the tooth x(T (i, a)) reflects the "happiness" of the applicant a ∈ A i . If x(T (i, a)) = 0, applicant a has reason to shift to institute i; on the other hand, the values collected from the shaft x(S(A i )) indicates the "happiness" of institute i: whether it is getting enough high ranking applicants (of the "right" class). An overall small comb value x(K(i, S(A i ))) thus expresses the likelihood of a blocking group including i and some of the applicants in A i . Now let K i denote the set all combs of institute i. We write down the linear program:
Suppose there is no classification, i.e., Hospitals/Residents problem. Then this LP reduces to the one formulated by Baïou and Balinski [3] . However, it turns out that this polytope is not integral. The example in Figure 2 demonstrates the non-integrality of the polytope. In particular, observe that since µ is applicant-optimal, in all other stable matchings, applicant a 3 can only be matched to i 5 . However, the value x i1a3 = 0.2 > 0 indicates that x is outside of the convex hull of integral stable matchings.
Here we make a critical observation. Suppose that in a certain matching µ φ , applicant a 3 is assigned to i 1 . Then a 2 cannot be assigned to i 1 due to the bound q + (C 1 1 ) (see Constraint (4.2)). If µ φ is to be stable, then a 2 must be assigned to some institute ranking higher than i 1 on his list (in this example there is none), otherwise, (i, µ φ (i 1 )| a3 a 2 ) is bound to be a blocking group in µ φ . Thus, the required constraint to avoid this particular counter-example can be written as
We now formalize the above observation. Given any class C i j ∈ C(i), we define a class-tuple t i j = (a i1 , a i2 , · · · , a iq + (C i j ) ). Such a tuple fulfills the following two conditions:
2. if C i j is a non-leaf class, then given any subclass
denote the set of applicants ranking lower than all applicants in t 
As before, it takes a somehow involved counting argument to prove the lemma but its basic idea is already portrayed in the above example. Now let T 
Let P f sm denote the set of all solutions satisfying (4.1)-(4.5) and P sm the convex hull of all (integral) stable matchings. In this section, our main result is P f sm = P sm . We say (i, a) are matched under x if x ia > 0. Definition 4.2. Let x ∈ P f sm and Ω i (x) be the set of applicants that are matched to institute i under x. Let Ω i (x) be composed of a i1 , a i2 , · · · , ordered based on the decreasing preference of institute i. 1 ; a 2 , a 6 ), (i 2 ; a 7 ), (i 3 ; a 4 ), (i 4 ; a 5 ), (i 5 ; a 1 , a 3 )} (A fractional matching x that is not inside the convex hull of integral stable matchings) .4) is not integral. Since µ is applicant-optimal, in all other stable matchings, applicant a 3 can only be matched to i 5 . However, the value x i1a3 = 0.2 > 0 indicates that x is outside of the convex hull of integral stable matchings.
Define
as a tuple composed of applicants for whom institute i is the most preferred institute that they are matched under x, i.e., an applicant a ∈ E i (x), if x(T (i, a)\{(i, a)}) = 0 and x ia > 0.
The order of the applicants in E i (x) is based on the decreasing preference of institute i.
Lemma 4.4. E i (x) is feasible for institute i.
Proof. We need to show that given any class C i j ∈ C(i),
We proceed by induction on the height of C 
. Now Constraint (4.5) is again violated in such a class-tuple.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose that x ∈ P f sm .
(i) For each institute i ∈ I, we can find two sets U and V of pairwise disjoint classes so that U ∪ V partitions L i and all applicants in Ω i (x)\H i (x) belong to the classes in U . Moreover,
(iv) a∈A x ia = |E i (x)| for all institutes i ∈ I.
Proof. For (i), given any applicant a ∈ Ω i (x)\H i (x), by Definition 4.2, there exists some class C i . Now (ia) is a consequence of counting. We will prove (ib)(ic) afterwards.
For (ii), by definition of H i (x), none of the applicants in Ω i (x)\H i (x) contributes to the shaft x(S(H i (x))). As a result, for Constraint (4.3) to hold for the comb K(i, S(H i (x))), every tooth-applicant a ∈ H i (x) must contribute at least 1, and indeed, by Constraint (4.1), exactly 1. So we have the first statement of (ii). The second statement holds because it cannot happen that x(T (i, a)) = x(T (i , a)) = 1, given that x ia > 0 and x i a > 0.
For (iii), By Definition 4.2, all sets E i (x) are disjoint; thus, every applicant who is matched under x belongs to exactly one E i (x) and at most one H i (x) by (ii). Therefore, i∈I |E i (x)| ≥ i∈I |H i (x)| and we just need to show that for each institute i, |E i (x)| ≤ |H i (x)|, and this follows by using (ia):
where the inequality follows from Lemma 4.4 and the fact all applicants in Ω i (x)\H i (x) are in classes in U . So this establishes (iii). Moreover, as Inequality (4.6) must hold with equality throughout, for each class
where the inequality follows from Constraint (4.2) and the rest can be deduced from (ib). By Constraint (4.3), the above inequality must hold with equality. So for each class
, giving us (ic) and implying that there is no applicant in C i k ∈ U who is matched to institute i under x ranking lower than all applicants in
Packing Algorithm We now introduce a packing algorithm to establish the integrality of the polytope. Our algorithm is generalized from that proposed by Sethuraman, Teo, and Qian [20] . Given x ∈ P f sm , for each institute i, we create |E i (x)| "bins," each of size (height) 1; each bin is indexed by (i, j), where 1 ≤ j ≤ |E i (x)|. Each x ia > 0 is an "item" to be packed into the bins. Bins are filled from the bottom to the top. When the context is clear, we often refer to those items x ia as simply applicants; if applicant a ∈ C i j , then the item x ia is said to belong to the class C i j . In Phase 0, each institute i puts the items x ia , if a ∈ H i (x), into each of its |E i (x)| bins. In the following phase, t = 1, 2, · · · , our algorithm proceeds by
• first finding out the set L t of bins with maximum available space;
• then assigning each of the bins in L t one item.
The assignment in each phase proceeds by steps, indexed by l = 1, 2, · · · , |L t |. The order of the bins in L t to be examined does not matter. How the institute i chooses the items to be put into its bins is the crucial part in which our algorithm differs from that of Sethuraman, Teo, and Qian. We maintain the following invariant.
Invariant C: The collection of the least preferred items in the |E i (x)| bins (e.g., the items currently on top of institute i's bins) should respect of the quotas of the classes in C(i).
Subject to this invariant, institute i chooses the best remaining item and adds it into the bin (i, j), which has the maximum available space in the current phase. This unavoidably raises another issue: how can we be sure that there is at least one remaining item for institute i to put into the bin (i, j) without violating Invariant C? We will address this issue in our proof. Theorem 4.1. Let x ∈ P f sm . Let M i,j be the set of applicants assigned to bin (i, j) at the end of any step of the packing procedure and a i,j be the lowest-ranking applicant of institute i in bin (i, j) (implying x iai,j is on top of bin (i, j)). Then (i) In any step, suppose that the algorithm is examining bin (i, j). Then institute i can find at least one item in its remaining items to add into bin (i, j) without violating Invariant C;
(iii) At the end of any step, institute i can organize a comb
(iv) At the end of any step, an item x ia is not put into institute i's bins if and only if there exists a class
(v) If x ia is packed and x i a is not, then i a i; (vi) At the end of any phase, the a i,j in all bins are distinct. In particular, for any applicant a who is matched under x, there exists some bin (i, j) such that a = a i,j .
Proof. We first assume that (ii) holds and prove (i).
Observe that (ii) implies that given any applicant a ∈ E i (x), its corresponding item x ia , if already put into a bin, must be on its top and fills it completely. Since (i, j) currently has available space, at least one applicant in E i (x) is not in institute i's bins yet. We claim that there exists at least one remaining applicant in E i (x) that can be added into bin (i, j). Suppose not. Let the set of applicants in E i (x) that are not put into i's bins be G. Given any applicant a ∈ G, there must exist some class C i k ∈ a(C(i)) for which
k , the subset of applicants in E i (x) that are already put into the bins but not belonging to any class in (B). Note that none of the applicants in G can be in the bin (i, j). Thus, by counting the number of the bins minus (i, j), we have
Note that all applicants in E i (x)\G are in some class in (B) (either they are already put into the bins or not). Then by the pigeonhole principle, there is at least one class
We now prove (ii)-(vi) by induction on the number of phases. In the beginning, (ii)(v)(vi) holds by Lemma 4.5(ii)(iii). (iii)(iv) hold by setting A i := H i (x) and observation Definition 4.2 and Lemma 4.5(ii). Suppose that the theorem holds up to Phase t. Let α be the maximum available space in Phase t + 1. Suppose that the algorithm is examining bin (i, j) and institute i chooses item x ia to be put into this bin. From (vi) of the induction hypothesis, applicant a is on top of another bin (i , j ), where i = i, in the beginning of phase t + 1. Then by (ii)(v) of the induction hypothesis,
where the last inequality follows from our assumption that in Phase t + 1, the maximum available space is α. Note also that
(bin (i , j ) is also examined in Phase t + 1).
Assume that A i is a tuple composed of applicants in
. For our induction step, let A i := A i | ai,j a, the new set of items on top of i's bins after a is put on top of a i,j .
We first prove (iv). Since x ia is not put into the bin before this step, by (iv) of the induction hypothesis, there exists some class C i al ∈ a(C(i)) for which
al be the smallest such class. Since x ia is allowed to put on top of x iai,j , a ij i a and
Now we show that all other items x ia fulfill the condition stated in (iv). There are two cases.
• Suppose that x ia is not put into the bins yet.
-Suppose that a i,j i a i a. We claim that it cannot happen that for all classes
i | a a is still feasible, in which case institute i would have chosen x ia , instead of x ia to put into bin (i, j), a contradiction.
-Suppose that a i,j i a i a . By (iv) of the induction hypothesis, there exists a class C i a l ∈ a (C(i)) for which
In both situations, the condition of (iv) regarding x ia is satisfied.
• Suppose that x ia is already put into the bins.
It is trivial if a i a, so assume that a i a . We claim that none of the classes C i a t ∈ a (C(i)) can be a subclass of C i al or C i al itself. Otherwise, C i al ∈ a (C(i)), and we have q
a |, a contradiction to (iv) of the induction hypothesis. Now since for every class C i a t ∈ a (C(i)), we have C
, where the strict inequality is due to the induction hypothesis.
We notice that the quantity
is exactly the sum of the shaft x(S(A i )) (before x ia is added) or x(S(A i )) (after x ia is added) by observing (iv). Below let x(M i,j ) and x(M i,j ) denote the total size of the items in bin (i, j) before and after x ia is added into it. So x(M i,j ) = x(M i,j ) + x ia . Now we can derive the following:
Note that the last equality is due to (ii) of the induction hypothesis. For the above inequality to hold,
Since x(M i,j ) = 1 − α and x(T (i, a)) ≤ α by Inequality (4.6), Inequality (4.8) must hold with equality, implying that x(K(i, S(A i ))) = |E i (x)|, giving us (iii). Since institute i puts x ia into bin (i, j), the "new" M i,j and the "new" a i,j (=a) satisfies
This establishes (ii). (v) follows because Inequality (4.6) must hold with equality throughout. Therefore, there is no institute i which ranks strictly between i and i and x i a > 0.
Finally for (vi), note that x(T (i, a)) = α if the item x ia is put into some bin in Phase t+1. All such items are the least preferred items in their respective "old" bins (immediately before Phase t + 1), it means the items on top of the newly-packed bins are still distinct. Moreover, from (4.7), if a bin (i, j) is not examined in Phase t + 1, then its least preferred applicant cannot be packed in phase t + 1 either.
We define an assignment µ α based on a number α ∈ [0, 1) as follows. Assume that there is a line of height α "cutting through" all the bins horizontally. If an item x ia whose position in i's bins intersects α, applicant a is assigned to institute i. In the case this cutting line of height α intersects two items in the same bin, we choose the item occupying the higher position. More precisely:
Given α ∈ [0, 1), for each institute i ∈ I, we define an assignment as follows: Proof. We generate uniformly at random a number α ∈ [0, 1) and use it to define an assignment µ α . To facilitate the discussion, we choose the largest α ≤ α so that µ α = µ α . Intuitively, this can be regarded as lowering the cutting line from α to α without modifying the assignment, and 1 − α is exactly the maximum available space in the beginning of a certain phase l during the execution of our packing algorithm. Note that the assignment µ α is then equivalent to giving those applicants (items) on top of institute i's bins to i at the end of phase l.
We now argue that µ α is a stable matching. First, it is a matching by Theorem 4.1(vi). The matching respects the quota of all classes since Invariant C is maintained. What remains to be argued is the stability of µ α . Suppose, for a contradiction, (i, a φ ) is a blocking pair. We consider the possible cases.
Case 1: Suppose that x ia φ > 0 and x ia φ is not put into the bins yet at the end of Phase l. Then by Theorem 4.1(iv) and the definition of blocking pairs, (i, a φ ) cannot block µ α . Case 2: Suppose that x ia φ > 0 and x ia φ is already put into the bins at the end of Phase l. If µ α (a φ ) = i, there is nothing to prove. So assume µ α (a φ ) = i and this means that the item x ia φ is "buried" under some other item on top of some of i's bins at the end of Phase l. Then by Theorem 4.1(v), a φ is assigned to some other institute ranking higher than i, contradicting the assumption that (i, a φ ) is a blocking pair. Case 3: Suppose that x ia φ = 0. There are two subcases:
Then we can form a new feasible tuple µ α (i)|a φ . It can be inferred from the definition of the shaft that
As a result,
. Let C i a φ l φ be the smallest such class. By definition of blocking pairs, there must exist an applicant a † ∈ µ α (i) ∩ C i a φ l φ who ranks lower than a φ . Choose a † to be the lowest ranking such applicant in µ α (i). We make the following critical observation:
To see this, we first argue that given an item x ia > 0, if it does not contribute to the shaft S(µ φ (i)), then it cannot contribute to shaft S(µ
a | (the first equality follows from the choice of a † ). In both cases, we conclude that
The term x ia † does not contribute to the shaft S(µ φ (i)| a † a φ ) by the same argument. Now using Constraint (4.3), Theorem 4.1(iii), and Inequality (4.9), we have
Note that the last equality makes use of the fact that x ia φ = 0. Now,
So µ α (a φ ) a φ i, again a contradiction to the assumption that (i, a φ ) blocks µ α . So we have established that the generated assignment µ α is a stable matching. Now the remaining proof is the same as in [21] . Assume that µ α (i, a) = 1 if and only if applicant a is assigned to institute i under µ α . Then a) dα and x can be written as a convex combination of µ α as α varies over the interval [0, 1). The integrality of the polytope thus follows.
Optimal Stable Matching
Since our polytope is integral, we can write suitable objective functions to target for various optimal stable matchings using Ellipsoid algorithm [8] . As the proposed LP has an exponential number of constraints, we also design a separation oracle to get a polynomial time algorithm. The basic idea of our oracle is based on dynamic programming. See [11] for details.
Median-Choice Stable Matching
An application of our polyhedral result is the following. Proof. Let x µt be the solution based on µ t for any 1 ≤ t ≤ k and apply our packing algorithm on the fractional solution x = P k t=1 xµ t k
. Then let α = 0.5 and µ 0.5 be the stable matching resulted from the cutting line of height α = 0.5. We make the following observation based on Theorem 4.1:
Suppose that applicant a is matched under x and those institutes with which he is matched are i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i k , ordered based on their rankings on a's preference list. Assume that he is matched to i t n t times among the k given stable matchings. At the termination of the packing algorithm, each of the items x i l a , 1 ≤ l ≤ k , appears in institute i l 's bins and its position is from Using similar ideas, we can show that an applicant-optimal stable matching must be institute-(lexicographical)-pessimal and similarly an applicant-pessimal stable matching must be institute-(lexicographical)-optimal: by taking x as the average of all stable matchings and consider the two matching µ and µ 1− with arbitrary small > 0. Hence, it is tempting to conjecture that the median choice stable matching is also a lexicographical median outcome for the institutes. Somehow surprisingly, it turns out not to be the case and a counter-example can be found in [11] .
4.3 Polytope for Many-to-Many "Unclassified" Stable Matching In the many-to-many stable matching problem, each entity e ∈ I ∪ A has a quota Q(e) ∈ Z + and a preference over a subset of the other side. A matching µ is feasible if given any entity e ∈ I ∪ A, (1) |µ(e)| ≤ Q(e), and (2) µ(e) is a subset of the entities on e s preference list. A feasible matching µ is stable if there is no blocking pair (i, a), which means that i prefers a to one of the assignments µ(i), or if |µ(i)| < Q(i) and a ∈ µ(i); and similarly a prefers i to one of his assignments µ(a), or if |µ(a)| < Q(a) and i ∈ µ(a).
We now transform the problem into (many-to-one) LCSM. For each applicant a ∈ A, we create Q(a) copies, each of which retains the original preference of a. All institutes replace the applicants by their clones on their lists. To break ties, all institutes rank the clones of the same applicant in an arbitrary but fixed manner. Finally, each institute treats the clones of the same applicant as a class with upper bound 1. It can be shown that the stable matchings in the original instance and in the transformed LCSM instance have a one-one correspondence. Thus, we can use Constraints (4.1)-(4.5) to describe the former 6 .
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduce classified stable matching and present a dichotomy theorem to draw a line between its polynomial solvability and NP-completeness.
We also study the problem using the polyhedral approach and propose polynomial time algorithms to obtain various optimal matchings. We choose the terms "institutes" and "applicants" in our problem definition, instead of the more conventional hospitals and residents, for a reason. We are aware that in real-world academics, many departments not only have ranking over their job candidates but also classify them based on their research areas. When they make their hiring decision, they have to take the quota of the classes into consideration. And in fact, we were originally motivated by this common practice.
classified stable matching has happened in real world. In a hospitals/residents matching program in Scotland, certain hospitals declared that they did not want more than one female physician. Roth [14] proposed an algorithm to show that stable matchings always exist.
There are quite a few questions that remain open. The obvious one would be to write an LP to describe LCSM with both upper bounds and lower bounds. Even though we can obtain various optimal stable matchings, the Ellipsoid algorithm can be inefficient. It would be nicer to have fast combinatorial algorithms. The rotation structure of Gusfield and Irving [9] seems the way to go. ) and denote this class as C a . We introduce a procedure to organize a set U of disjoint classes.
Let G be composed of a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a |G| ordered based on their decreasing rankings on L i For i = 1 To |G| if a i ∈ C ∈ U , then do nothing else U := U \{C|C ∈ U, C ⊂ C a l } // C a l may be a superclass of classes in U U := U ∪ {C a l }. //adding C a l into U Claim The output U from the above procedure comprises of a disjoint set of classes containing all applicants in G, and for each class C We will prove the claim shortly. Now either a ∈ G and a ∈ C ∈ U , or that a ∈ G (implying that x(T (i, a)) = 1). Moreover, y(C (ii) follows from the fact that a ranks higher than a l and the way we define a class in D. For (iii), first notice that if C i j ∈ (B ∪ U ) and C i j ∈ U , then such a class C i j must be part of (B) and C i j may contain some classes in U . Now suppose that a i ∈ G ∩ L i a l but does not belong to any class in U . Then our procedure would have added the class C ai into U before examining a l , a contradiction. To see the last statement of (iii), let G be set of applicants in L where the first inequality follows from the first part of (iii), the second inequality the induction hypothesis, the third the fact that C We will prove the claim shortly. Observe that given any class C where the first inequality follows from the definition of the class-tuple. Now we have
a contradiction. Note that the first inequality follows from Constraint (4.2), the second inequality from (A.2), the equality right after is because every applicant in G belongs to some class in B, and the last inequality is due to (A.1).
